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ARTICLE
Deceptive counterfeit risk in global supply chains
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ABSTRACT
The study investigates deceptive counterfeits in the global supply chains. It explores perceived 
sources of counterfeits, their impact and identifies risk mitigation strategies in Business-to- 
Business procurement. An online survey was used to collect data from 140 procurement 
professionals targeted at a national purchasing body and affiliated UK purchasing groups. 
The study findings show that counterfeit breaches are increasing, especially in low-cost spare 
parts, sourced from tier-two suppliers based in developing countries. Counterfeits lead to high 
costs, delays, lost sales, product recalls and even legal action. Network transparency, cost of 
quality and pre-supply evaluation approaches and supplier relationship management are the 
most effective mitigation strategies to overcome deceptive counterfeit risk in global supply 
chains. The study contributes to supply chain academics and practitioners’ growing research 
interest in counterfeit risk.
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Supply chains (SCs) have become geographically dis-
persed and complex, raising increasing issues with 
regard to the traceability and visibility of the products 
and services they exchange (MacCarthy et al. 2016; 
Revilla and Saenz 2017; Cao, Bryceson, and Hine 
2020). Manufacturers and consumers face a growing 
issue with the provenance or authenticity of products 
exchanged through global supply chains. 
Counterfeiters increasingly have access to the same 
quality of technology used by Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) (Stevenson and Busby 2015). 
However, on its own, the capability to produce see-
mingly high-quality components would not threaten 
global SCs. Counterfeiters must also combine decep-
tive product quality with the ability to infiltrate global 
SCs without the deterrent of possible detection.
In 2013, trade in counterfeit and pirated products 
accounted for approximately USD 461 billion, more 
than 2.5% of world trade (OECD/EUIPO 2016). This 
has risen steadily and stands at 3.3.% of world trade 
(OECD 2019). over the years, Counterfeits can be cate-
gorised into two types based on the consumer per-
spective, either as non-deceptive or deceptive 
products (Grossman and Shapiro 1988). non- 
deceptive counterfeits are those which consumers 
can easily differentiate, based on signals such as 
price, quality and nature of the sale (Engebø et al. 
2017). In contrast, deceptive counterfeits are sold 
under similar conditions and comparable to that of 
the original (Grossman and Shapiro 1988). Recently 
the Chinese government uncovered counterfeit 
COVID-19 vaccines smuggled overseas (BBC 2021; 
CNN News, 2021). With its focus on professional B2B 
purchasing, this study investigates deceptive counter-
feits, where the buyer receives no signals to indicate 
that the goods might be counterfeit. For example, 
when a consumer finds an expensive perfume for sale 
from a temporary stall at a backstreet market at 
a quarter of the retail price, there are sufficient signals 
for even the consumer who makes a purchase to buy 
with the knowledge that similarity of appearance to 
the original expensive perfume does not offer the 
authentic fragrance. In B2B markets, sometimes, the 
contextual signals concerning the veracity of products 
provided by the supply chain are high enough to dis-
pel doubts – the appearance, the price and, above all 
here, the distribution (supply chain) faithfully imitate 
that of authentic products; hence these are deceptive 
counterfeits. According to Spink et al. (2013), deceptive 
counterfeits products are offered in the market as 
genuine to deceive the purchaser. Examples of such 
B2B deceptive counterfeits include electronic semicon-
ductors used in US Navy Boeing P-8 Poseidon aircraft 
(The United States Senate Committee on Armed 
Services 2012), plastics used in Aston Martin’s super-
cars (Klayman 2014), metal used on NASA satellites 
(Potter 2009), components of nuclear power plants 
(IAEA 2000) and several more.
Counterfeits threaten manufacturers, consumers 
and the public, as these products are unable to 
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perform as intended (Wee, Ta, and Cheok 1995). 
Procurement is most often the entry point into the 
‘supply side’, as this department/function is responsi-
ble for selecting and evaluating suppliers (Booth 2014) 
in Supply Chain Management. Therefore, the procure-
ment process has a critical gatekeeper role to play in 
preventing counterfeits.
Counterfeit goods threaten a wide range of indus-
tries (and their customers) including automotive, elec-
tronics, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, media, and 
fashion (Berman 2008; Wilcock and Boys 2014; Bian 
et al. 2016). The quality of pharmaceutical products is 
difficult to assess, making them a most attractive sec-
tor for counterfeiters (Staake, Thiesse, and Fleisch 
2012; De Lima et al. 2018). More recently, new internet- 
based distribution channels (platforms, e.g., Darknet 
and social media) have played an essential role in 
increasing the amount of illegal counterfeit sales 
(Buxton and Bingham 2015). Indeed, the general rise 
of e-commerce has been identified as the key driver 
behind counterfeiting growth, especially through B2B 
online marketplaces (Liang and Gai 2015). As globalisa-
tion in SCs increases, the potential scale and scope of 
counterfeit risk rises (Li and Yi 2017). However, the 
anticipated parallel rise in academic studies in this 
area has not been realised (Richter et al. 2017).
On the contrary, extant research on deceptive coun-
terfeits occurrences, their impact on supply chains and 
how to prevent deceptive counterfeits in the global 
B2B SC market is scant. Interestingly, contingent mar-
keting literature is dominated by studies on the per-
ception and attitude of consumers towards counterfeit 
products (the demand side of counterfeiting), and by 
anti-counterfeiting strategies for brand managers 
(Roux, Bobrie, and Thébault 2016; Pueschel, 
Chamaret, and Parguel 2017; Kros et al. 2019). 
However, studies considering the counterfeit threat 
from a supply-side perspective are limited (Staake, 
Thiesse, and Fleisch 2009). Zhang and Zhang (2015) 
looked at counterfeiting in relation to SC structures. 
Although there are a few relevant studies (e.g., Li 2013; 
Li and Yi 2017), it is still to become a mainstream SC 
topic. Furthermore, the complicated risk profile 
involved in counterfeiting and the grey market is not 
fully explored from SC network or risk management 
perspective (Wald and Holleran 2007; De Lima et al. 
2018; Machado, Paiva, and Da Silva 2018; Ghadge et al. 
2012). There is an evident need for studies that exam-
ine counterfeit risk in terms of its origins, impacts and 
mitigation within the SC context. Extant academic lit-
erature appears to offer no discussion around the SC 
areas/functions that are most prone to counterfeits 
and are the entry point for how counterfeits enter 
global supply networks. Counterfeit risk represents 
a disruptive force to SC stakeholders including suppli-
ers, manufacturers and distributors (Kros et al. 2019), 
and need careful exploration. Chaudhry and Stumpf 
(2013) state that counterfeit products should be 
detected further up the SC network. There are very 
few empirical studies that examine the origins of the 
counterfeiting threat or that propose mitigation stra-
tegies from a SC or strategic procurement perspective 
(Staake, Thiesse, and Fleisch 2009; Zhang and Zhang 
2015; DiMase et al. 2016; Machado, Paiva, and Da Silva 
2018; Kros et al. 2019). Therefore, the objectives of this 
empirical study are to:
RO1) Explore the perceived SC sources and impacts of 
deceptive counterfeits.
RO2) Identify mitigation strategies employed to over-
come deceptive counterfeits.
This study contributes to this research gap by pro-
viding valuable insights into the sources, impacts and 
mitigation of deceptive counterfeits in the global sup-
ply chain environment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
In section 2, a comprehensive literature review on 
counterfeit risk in global supply chains. Section 3 
explains the research approach. Section 4 presents 
the data collected and addresses the two research 
objectives. Section 5 provides discussion and identifies 
several future research directions in the form of a series 
of propositions emerging from this study and con-
cludes with limitations.
Literature review
Counterfeit risk in global supply chains
Counterfeit products are a significant threat, especially 
for the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries. In 
2015, the counterfeit pharmaceutical drug market alone 
was worth 200 billion USD (Wall Street Journal 2015). 
Counterfeits do not adhere to quality standards and are 
not supported by any (genuine) inspection report or 
performance history. A review of definitions for counter-
feiting and counterfeit products from academic and 
industry (non-academic) sources is collated in Table 1.
Marucheck et al. (2011) identified key breaches of 
product safety relating to global sourcing (supply) of 
components relating to low cost and recent changes 
to the SC structure. SCs are vulnerable to the risks 
posed by counterfeits primarily because of the limited 
experience, both of the existence of counterfeit pro-
ducts (from seemingly reliable sources) and their 
potential adverse effects. Such effects include damage 
to brand image, loss of revenue, decline in product 
innovation, hazards to consumer health and safety 
and even fatalities (Stevenson and Busby 2015; Li and 
Yi 2017). Risk assessment in this area should focus on 
the sources and impact of counterfeit products, includ-
ing the potential consequences of counterfeits’ risks 
(Kleindorfer and Saad 2005).
Deceptive counterfeits appear to be original and are 
sold as a genuine part via conventional business 
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channels (Grossman and Shapiro 1988; Zhang and 
Zhang 2015). Interestingly, they may even conform to 
the standards of the genuine article in low-level testing 
(Stevenson and Busby 2015). No buyer would know-
ingly buy deceptive counterfeits for their organisation 
unless corruption and bribery were involved (Huang 
and Li 2015).
It appears that major disclosures of counterfeit 
breaches have been ‘accidental or incidental’ 
outcomes of a public investigation into a public spend-
ing issue, i.e., not the primary focus of the original 
investigation. This is certainly true of the defence and 
aerospace industries and, again, where there are clear 
threats to public safety, in the cases from the pharma-
ceutical, healthcare and nuclear industries. Several 
supplier organisations such as World Bearings or the 
Semi-Conductor Industry Association have set up spe-
cialist websites to highlight the risk posed by counter-
feit items and to propose actions that can be taken 
when a counterfeit is discovered. Other practitioner 
organisations such as the Chartered Institute of 
Purchasing and Supply (CIPS) have web-based knowl-
edge sections dedicated to this area, again highlight-
ing how much more seriously practice has engaged 
with the [B2B] counterfeit issue than supply-side aca-
demics. Table 2 presents some of the publicly reported 
B2B deceptive counterfeit breaches classified by indus-
try/sector.
In terms of impacts, counterfeits lead to high costs 
for the OEM in terms of delays, lost sales, product 
recalls, and even legal action. Counterfeits may 
cause severe consequences including loss of life, 
damage to brand image, loss of revenue, and various 
hazards to consumer health and safety, including 
fatalities (Spink et al. 2013; Stevenson and Busby 
2015; Bian et al. 2016; Ding, Stevenson, and Busby 
2017). The indirect costs include lost time and the 
goodwill of the buyer, negatively affecting buyer- 
supplier trust and thus the supply chain relationship 
(Ghadge et al. 2017). Industrial strategies on counter-
feits in global supply chains include avoidance, detec-
tion, mitigation and destruction. Avoidance is the 
most cost-effective method, as it has the lowest cost 
of action and reaction. However, a significant problem 
with this strategy is ensuring total avoidance. 
The second approach is detection, which relies on 
testing raw materials and parts inputs that have 
high economic value or are of critical importance 
(Wilcock and Boys 2014). The third strategy, mitiga-
tion, can be described as preventing a counterfeit 
based on previous experience; therefore, it assumes 
a product or system failure has occurred through 
counterfeiting. Mitigation is, therefore, the riskiest 
strategy because not all the counterfeits may be 
caught (Stradley and Karraker 2006). It is important 
to isolate, record and then destroy counterfeits once 
they are discovered. A 100% destruction strategy pre-
vents the possible future spread of that particular 
counterfeit and enables clear communication to 
other interested parties about that particular threat. 
Companies may also protect the reliability of their 
distribution channel by using certified stores (Zhang 
and Zhang 2015). Chaudhry and Stumpf (2013) pro-
vide a discussion on government, agency and com-
pany-led initiatives to fight back against counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals. The anti-counterfeiting approaches 
Table 1. Different definitions of counterfeiting and counterfeit 
products.
Definitions from Academic Sources
Term Definition Reference
Counterfeiting ‘Any unauthorised manufacturing 
of goods whose special 
characteristics are protected as 
intellectual property rights 






Counterfeiting ‘an original product with 
a remarkable brand value 
worth copying already exists 
on the market. Its 
characteristics are copied into 
another product as to be 
indistinguishable from the 
original and sold at a lower 
price as if it were the original, 
whereas consumers are well 
aware of the difference 






‘trade in goods that, be it due to 
their design, trademark, logo, 
or company name, bear 
without authorisation 
a reference to a brand, 
a manufacturer, or any 
organisation that warrants for 
the quality or standard 
conformity of the goods in 
such a way that the counterfeit 
merchandise could, potentially, 
be confused with goods that 
rightfully use this reference’
(Staake, Thiesse, 
and Fleisch 2009, 
322)
Definitions from Industry Sources
Counterfeit 
part
‘a product produced or altered to 
resemble a product without the 
authority or right to do so, with 
the intent to mislead or 
defraud by presenting the 





‘a copy or substitute without legal 
right or authority to do so or 
one whose material, 
performance, or characteristics 
are knowingly misrepresented 





‘Material whose origin, age, 
composition, configuration, 
certification status or other 
characteristics (including 
whether or not the material 
has been used previously) has 
been falsely reported by the 
misleading marketing of the 
material, labelling or 
packaging; misleading 
documentation, and any other 
means including failing to 
disclose information’.
(MoD 2014, 3)
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discussed in their study (ibid) include consumer edu-
cation campaigns, company-led social media initia-
tives, verification of drugs through labelling 
technology, and authentication technology in ports 
and borders.
Research methodology
A questionnaire was developed to investigate the 
sources, impacts, and mitigation strategies associated 
with deceptive counterfeits in global supply chain envir-
onments. The research questions were designed follow-
ing an iterative process to capture the critical aspects of 
deceptive counterfeits within a B2B context; these ques-
tions were developed based on extant literature from 
academic and industry sources. Primary data in the form 
of responses to the survey were collected using an online 
survey. The online survey link (via SurveyMonkey®) was 
sent to professionals working in the international procure-
ment and supply field. These individuals were accessed 
via the CIPS, the UK’s premier and global professional 
procurement and supply professional organisation. It 
has more than 200,000 members spread across 150 dif-
ferent countries (CIPS 2020). The study utilised the wider 
reach of the CIPS network and contacted members from 
affiliated purchasing groups. The online survey was sent 
to 1350 members via email and LinkedIn message. The 
survey link was live (collecting data) for three months 
(June-August) in the year 2016, and several reminders 
were sent to encourage participation. Participants were 
assured that their responses would be reported, ensuring 
complete anonymity and confidentiality in order to 
increase candidness and disclosure associated with coun-
terfeits. In total, 156 responses were received by the close 
of the survey. Ultimately, 140 useable responses were 
collected for analysis in this study, eliminating invalid 
(which typically meant that the same rating for all ques-
tions had been given) responses. Revisiting survey 
responses found that 32 respondents did not complete 
the full survey. Although a 10.4% response rate is low, it is 
believed to be acceptable given the necessarily sensitive 
nature of the subject. Furthermore, similar past ‘low- 
response’ survey-based studies in SCs (e.g., Zhang et al. 
2016; Pueschel, Chamaret, and Parguel 2017; Domingues, 
Sampaio, and Arezes 2017; Laari, Töyli, and Ojala 2017; 
Zimon and Madzík 2020) support the acceptability of the 
low response rate. Therefore, the sample size can be 
considered a good representation of B2B procurement 
organisations.
Data analysis
From the pool of 140 respondents, 28 respondents 
were from a strategic/tactical management level (e.g., 
SC manager, company director, general manager, etc.), 
66 respondents were from an operational manage-
ment level (procurement manager, coordinator, spe-
cialist, etc.). The remaining 46 respondents classified 
themselves as other (procurement consultant, pur-
chase administrator, ledger clerk, etc.). The sample 
provided a mix of procurement respondent roles and 
a diversity deemed instrumental in capturing a holistic 
picture of the problem.
Figure 1 represents the breakdown of the renew-
able energy industry (including oil and gas), contribut-
ing close to 50% of the total responses. There was also 
a good response from other industry sectors such as 
services (9%), manufacturing-other (9%), semiconduc-
tors (3%) and healthcare/pharmaceuticals (3%). The 
annual procurement spends of the organisations are 
presented in Table 3. It is evident that the survey 
Table 2. List of publicly reported B2B deceptive counterfeit breaches.
Industry Firm affected Year Type of counterfeit Impact Source
Aerospace NASA 2009 False titanium on satellite Delayed launch by 3 weeks (Potter 2009)
NASA 2014 False analogue devices 
discovered
Failed to active seawater 
activated release system
(NASA)
Boeing 2011 Deceptive semi-conductors Found in ice detection 
modules supplied p-8 by 
a subcontractor
(The United States Senate 
Committee on Armed 
Services 2012)
Prat and Whitney 2014 False titanium used in engines Delayed F-35 production at 
a considerable cost
(Capaccio 2014)
Lockheed-Martin 2011 false random access memory 
chips
used in C130J and C27J, heads 
up displays.
(The United States Senate 
Committee on Armed 
Services 2012)
Lockheed-Martin 2011 Fake transistors in sea hawk 
helicopters
Effectively grounded the 
helicopter
Ibid
Automotive Aston Martin 2014 Fake DuPont plastic Recall 175,000 cars (Klayman 2014)
Nuclear South Korea 2012 False safety documents 
discovered
3 nuclear power plants were 
shut down
(Cho 2014)
Defence Raytheon 2011 Fake memory cards in a thermal 
high altitude area defence 
system
12 million USD System 
rendered inoperable
(The United States Senate 
Committee on Armed 
Services 2012)
Pharmaceutical NHS 2007 Fake drugs entered SC and 
given to patients
21,000 packs still untraced (Kemp 2012)
Zimmer, Inc. 2012 Counterfeit chips Units affected went 
unexpectedly into lockdown
(USFDA 2012)
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covered small, medium and large-scale organisations 
sourcing/operating globally.
The responses were global, capturing operations and 
supply bases of various businesses from North America, 
Asia, the Middle East, Australia to Europe. Figure 2 repre-
sents the percentages of the geographic area based on 
the respondent organisations’ operations and supply 
base. 46% of respondents indicated that their supply 
base was located in only one region, whereas 49% said 
that their supply base consisted of three or more regions.
Figure 1. Breakdown of survey participants by industry.
Table 3. Annual procurement spend of organisations.
Annual procurement spend in USD Percentage
30,000,000,000 < x 1%
20,000,000,000 < x ≤ 30,000,000,000 9%
10,000,000,000 < x ≤ 20,000,000,000 5%
1,000,000,000 < x ≤ 10,000,000,000 18%
500,000,000 < x ≤ 1,000,000,000 9%
100,000,000 < x ≤ 500,000,000 14%
20,000,000 < x ≤ 100,000,000 13%
5,000,000 < x ≤ 20,000,000 15%
x ≤ 5,000,000 10%
Blank/No answer 6%
Figure 2. Geographic area of operations and supply base of the companies.
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Counterfeit sources and impact
Supply-side occurrence analysis attempts to iden-
tify the nature and frequency of deceptive counter-
feits, explore how they enter SCs, and identify 
consequences. With regard to investigating the 
number of counterfeit purchases, half of the 
respondents could not estimate the number of 
counterfeit purchases (per year) made by their 
organisation and did not respond to this question. 
The remaining 28% of respondents (mainly from 
non-renewable energy, oil & gas, manufacturing 
(all), and services industries) stated that approxi-
mately 1 to 10 purchases of counterfeits were 
made by their company in a year. Figure 3 shows 
the percentages of the total number of counterfeit 
purchases per year; only a small minority estimated 
that their organisation made over 20 counterfeit 
purchases per year.
Chi-square tests were applied to check whether 
there is a relationship between respondents’ coun-
terfeit experiences and their responses to various 
questions such as industry, job title, and operation 
area. A significant relationship was found between 
job title and counterfeit experience (Table 4). 
Although the ρ-value, 0.047, is very close to 0.05, 
analysis of the data shows that participants’ level in 
the organisational hierarchy affects their experience 
of deceptive counterfeits. Most of the respondents 
from an operational level had experienced 
a counterfeit breach. This finding speaks about 
much repeated here sensitivity of the counterfeit 
issue; Are counterfeit episodes reported or are 
they effectively buried? Are senior management 
levels supportive of transparent reporting? Would 
reporting a counterfeit episode be career damaging; 
for example, echoing whistleblower and ‘shooting 
the messenger’ concerns? Without a culture of com-
munication and reporting about counterfeit pur-
chases the risk of sustained underreporting of 
counterfeits continues. This result highlights the 
importance of communication between different 
departments and levels of the organisation over 
counterfeit risks.
Respondents who had experienced a deceptive 
counterfeit breach (42%) reported that the occurrence 
was driven by deceptive quality and documentation. 
Participants were asked to select the region(s) that 
constitutes the largest source of counterfeits based 
on their experience. As shown in Figure 4, China was 
identified as the riskiest region, followed by Africa, 
India, and other parts of Asia (excluding China and 
India).
To explore how deceptive counterfeits breach SCs, 
survey participants were asked where they perceive 
counterfeits to be most prevalent. Regarding spend 
level, a large majority of the respondents that had 
deceptive counterfeit experience (71%), selected low- 
cost items as the most frequent source for the counter-
feits. The remaining (29%) respondents stated that 
high-cost items are the most frequent counterfeit cate-
gory. One respondent commented: ‘Risks exist on tools 
and MRO purchases’ (R69). Low-cost items, typically fall 
under the ‘desirable’ category of VED (vital, essential 
and desirable) product classification (Botter and 
Fortuin 2000), are likely to have a less rigid specifica-
tion and be sourced from a larger pool of suppliers 
than high-cost items; companies have a ‘brand’ buying 
tendency for high-cost items. Also, suppliers of high- 
cost products are mostly OEM/OCM or larger enter-
prises. These suppliers’ products are subject to higher 
scrutiny and quality inspection than the supplies of 
low-cost parts.
The survey responses also indicate that spare parts 
are perceived to be the most frequent source of coun-








Don't know 0 1-10 11-20 Above 20
Figure 3. Number of counterfeit purchases per year.
Table 4. Chi-Square test for the relationship between counter-
feit experience and job title.
Parameters Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 9.658a 4 0.047
Likelihood Ratio 9.800 4 0.044
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.590 1 0.207
a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 4.60.
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counterfeit experience. This finding was based on the 
respondents that have experienced deceptive counter-
feits only. Among those counterfeit experienced 
respondents, 70% said that deceptive counterfeits are 
more frequent in spare parts, and 30% regarded origi-
nal equipment as the most frequent source of decep-
tive counterfeits. Branded OEM products command 
a premium price, providing buyers with an incentive 
to find substitutes and potential counterfeiters with 
the incentive of large margins. According to the 
respondents, metals are the riskiest category of coun-
terfeit products, followed by chemicals, bearings, semi-
conductors, and plastics.
A high percentage (64%) of the respondents with 
counterfeit experience complained about the availabil-
ity of forged certificates and test reports for goods and 
equipment they purchased. Table 5 shows some of the 
examples of deceptive counterfeit SC breaches identi-
fied in the survey. The counterfeits in this table range 
from deceptive metal fittings to fake surgical tools to 
lifting shackles. These examples highlight the exten-
sive range of goods that are counterfeited globally. 
Deceptive counterfeits occur with increasing fre-
quency, and the majority of the examples in the survey 
have occurred in the year 2016. In both Tables 2 and 3, 
the relative cost of the reported counterfeit parts is low 
in comparison to total spend. This reinforces one of the 
findings of this study that counterfeits are most pre-
valent in low-cost items.
While the conventions currently governing the cost 
of quality include the cost of replacing a part and 
finding the source of the quality problem (Farooq 
et al. 2017), respondents were not able to estimate 
the direct financial implications of a counterfeit breach. 
Related participants responded ‘Difficult to say. 
Anything from a few hundred dollars to millions, if it 
causes a malfunction’ (R29), ‘It could be catastrophic 
for critical parts’ (R60), ‘wide open . . . .in a drilling opera-
tion, the cost can be as much as 1.6 USD M per day’ 
(R111). ‘more than a cost, higher implications for safety 
and security in our [aerospace] sector’. The cost of 
a counterfeit episode is highly variable because it 
depends on the criticality and the value of the coun-
terfeited product and how early the breach is uncov-
ered and acted upon.
Figure 5 shows the percentages of the respondents’ 
answers for the SC levels or tiers in which the counter-
feits entered SCs. Nearly half of the participants indi-
cated that counterfeits breached their SCs via 
their second-tier suppliers (Figure 5). This highlights 
the need for greater SC visibility; again raising the 
issue of the hidden costs of ‘opaque’ sourcing 
strategies.
Counterfeit risk mitigation
This section explores the most frequent anti- 
counterfeit strategies employed by procurement pro-
fessionals. Further sub-questions aim to assess the 
effectiveness of these practices and determine the 
reasons for selecting these strategies. Figure 6 presents 
the 12 anti-counterfeit practices proposed by the CIPS.
Respondents were asked to select the most effec-
tive anti-counterfeit strategies based on their supply 
management experience. The three most common 
practices the survey responses identified were; i) high- 
level specification, ii) contract performance review and 
continuous improvement, iii) supplier relationship 
management and supplier contract management/ 
development. The overlap between practices (ii) and 
(iii) reflects how different organisations group their 
activities in these respondent-provided descriptions. 
However, the predominant emphasis on contract man-
agement reflects how a critical responsibility of B2B 
purchasing functions underpins quality assurance and 
is, therefore, the front line for preventing any quality 
problems including counterfeits.
One of the respondents stated that ‘the rest of the 
SCs can follow these specifications to overcome 






Asia (excluding China and India)
Africa
China
Figure 4. Largest source of deceptive counterfeits based on respondents’ experience.
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counterfeits’ (R42). The higher or tighter the quality 
specification, the more the purchasing function is con-
strained, and the number of potential suppliers 
reduced. Therefore, high-level specifications as 
a measure to deter counterfeits involve additional 
transactions costs for the firm and perhaps higher 
prices in choosing from a smaller pool of qualified 
suppliers; these costs have to be traded off against 
the costs of the quality of counterfeits. The second 
most effective practice is contract performance review 
and continuous improvement (CPR & CI). This strategy 
relates to post-contract award management. This 
response is different to iii) in its focus on continuous 
improvement – which as part of the quality process 
would involve suppliers committing to continuous 
improvements that would be beyond the capabilities 
of a counterfeiter and, therefore, could be 
a preventative mechanism when part of the contract.
The third most effective practice is Supplier 
Relationship Management (SRM) and Supplier 
Contract Management/Development (SCMD); ‘keeps 
communication of issues open and visible’ (R31), ‘ . . . 
enables us to switch strategic suppliers if a poor quality 
occurs’ (R77), ‘.allows the buyer to engage with key 
suppliers at an early stage of the process’ (R92), and 
‘ . . . helps to understand our supply base better’ (R2). 
SRM is usually associated with critical suppliers, as it is 
considered resource-intensive. Low-cost sources do 
not usually include SRM for that reason, but it is likely 
that SRM practices will differ within the sample, and 
the survey cannot comment on that with precision. 
Both SRM & SCMD and CPR & CI have emphasised 
QA/QC, providing a potential evidence base for 
a more sophisticated view of the costs of quality and 
improved anti-counterfeit quality assurance.
Counter-intuitively, although CPR & CI and SRM & 
SCMD are among the top three most effective anti- 
counterfeit practices reported, neither appear in the 
top three reported most frequently used practices. The 
complex structure of these activities makes it difficult 
to adapt and mitigate their deployment. Similarly, 
although evaluation of suppliers’ tender/bid documen-
tation, pre-qualification questionnaire and specifica-
tion are among the top three most frequent 
practices, they are the seventh and sixth most effective 
reported practices, respectively, based on the survey 
responses. This indicates that despite their extensive 
usage, these practices are not perceived to be the most 
effective by the respondents. Yet, respondents place 
great confidence in the potential efficiency of such 
evaluations of a supplier’s tender/bid: ‘depending on 
exact nature of the method and verification mechanisms 
(e.g. auditing), at bid stage companies tend to be more 
compliant in terms of upfront reviews and verifications’ 
(R10), ‘it is crucial to know what your vendor is offering 
you and be confident of their SC’, and ‘careful evaluation 
will ensure their capabilities and compliance’ (R82). 
These responses indicate that buyers’ have confidence 
that pre-supply evaluation processes could cope with 
the counterfeit threat but that current practices need 
adaptation to be both effective as a deterrent and cost- 
effective as a solution.
Table 5. Examples of deceptive counterfeit breaches identified 
in survey.
Type of Counterfeit Year Impact of Counterfeit Industry
Deceptive metal 
fittings









2015 Cost of 500,000 USD 





Tool shearing off 
down hole causing 
3 days’ worth of 
lost rig time
N/A Contractual action 




Flanges were not of 
the quality 
expected as had 
been quoted in the 
vendor’s proposal 
and stipulated on 
the Purchase Order
2012 N/A Non-renewable 
Energy
Piping falsely labelled 
as 316 SS




Lifting shackles 2007 This resulted in an 
extensive 
examination, 





Fake cooling gas for 
large heat 
exchangers




Valves provided by 
a manufacturer 
were made using 
lower grade 
material and made 
in China even 
though the request 
was clear on 
materials to be 
used and where to 
be manufactured.
2016 Investigation ongoing Non-renewable 
Energy
Purchase of surgical 
instruments




quality systems had 
failed.
Healthcare
Steel was not to BS 
Standards
2016 None was caught 
internally
Construction
The vendor had 
embossed the 
marking on the 




further, this was 
material from the 
Asian market, and 
our specification 
indicated other 
specific regions. On 
material analysis, it 
was found to be 
a lesser grade than 
that we required.
2014 The vendor was 
blacklisted, and 
a liquidated 
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Few participants came up with the rather run of the 
mill or stock proposal of ‘additional training’ to increase 
organisational awareness regarding counterfeits as 
a mitigation strategy. Other responses were more 
reflective as follows: ‘Undertake awareness sessions, 
raise the subject’ (R53), ‘Encourage more widespread 
sharing of examples across the industry’ (R103), and 
‘Wider industry focus and sharing of information’ (R11).
Anti-counterfeiting campaigns, publications about 
counterfeit risk and examples from different industries, 
informative emails, improved communication and col-
laboration between different departments (e.g., 
commercial, legal, quality and technical staff), and 
development of a general framework for the sources 
and impacts of counterfeiting was also identified. 
A high percentage of the respondents emphasised 
the importance of training and information sharing 
about counterfeiting examples and cases encountered 
within organisations. Several respondents recom-
mended developing common knowledge-sharing plat-
forms to share counterfeit experiences and statistics 
for wider SC networks. The above findings are 
expected to benefit SC professionals in better mana-
















Evaluation of Market and Commodity Options - Including
Make or Buy Assessment
Developing Purchasing Strategy and Plan
Pre Procurement Market Test and Engagement
Develop Documentation, Pre Qualification Questionnaire
and Specification
Supplier Selection to participate in ITT RFP Negotiation
Issue ITT RFP Negotiation
Evaluate Suppler Tender/Bid
Contract Award
Warehouse Logistics and Receipt
Contract Performance Review and Continuous
Improvement
Supplier Relationship Management and Supplier Contract
Management and Development
Figure 6. Frequency of anti-counterfeit practices.
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Conclusion
Discussion
This study addresses area of deceptive counterfeits in 
global SC environments. An online survey was con-
ducted with international purchasing professionals 
from varying industries, supply bases and back-
grounds, generating 140 useable responses. The 
research objectives behind the survey focused on 
understanding the sources of counterfeits, their fre-
quency, the impacts of counterfeits and counterfeit 
mitigation strategies. Whilst the data were analysed 
following statistical approaches, and some statically 
validated insights were drawn, in the main, this is an 
exploratory study, the raw data of the responses are 
very much perceptual responses. Table 6 presents 
a summary of the findings.
What we have presented here is, we believe, an 
accurate presentation of the current state of deceptive 
counterfeits. However, that state or knowledge base is 
sketchy, anecdotal, unconnected, and lacking the 
validity that comes from knowledge sharing and thus 
open for debate.
Future research directions
In this section, the agenda for further research into 
deceptive counterfeits is provided. Given the diverse 
and amorphous state of academic knowledge in this 
area, this study sets out to create the future research 
platform through a series of concrete and cumulative 
propositions:
(P1) The random way in which deceptive counterfeits are 
discovered suggests there are many more in use than 
estimates identify to-date.
It was found that, typically, counterfeits are not 
discovered by deliberate techniques such as audits; 
this suggests there may be many more in B2B use 
than previous estimates suggest. This proposition is 
also supported by those working at operational 
levels reporting more counterfeit episodes than 
more senior levels. Future research can look into 
capturing deceptive counterfeit risks in global sup-
ply chains.
(P2) Many deceptive counterfeits appear to offer an 
acceptable level of quality
This is a debatable proposition, yet it builds on the 
logic in P1 above. It is also supported (indirectly) by the 
consumer-facing marketing literature on counterfeits. 
Consumer counterfeits, often with clear counterfeit 
signalling – very low price, and a ‘down market’ chan-
nel – continue to sell; somehow, they offer an accep-
table level of quality (Wilcox, Kim, and Sen 2009). Some 
professional buyers may, indeed, be aware that they 
are purchasing/using counterfeits, in which case the 
‘deception’ is between that organisation and its SC, 
which goes beyond the sophistication of the data. 
There is an evident need for robust data to better 
understand deceptive counterfeits.
(P3) Underreporting will continue until there is a major 
incident that energizes key stakeholders to demand 
greater transparency.
The fact that those working at operational levels report 
more counterfeit episodes than more senior levels is 
used, again, to support this proposition. This pattern of 
risks hidden in the SC and only being exposed by one 
tragic event has been seen before, notably with high 
street clothing retailers and brands.
(P4) The assumption within current practice and supply 
chain literature is that counterfeiters are motivated by 
short-term profit. Counterfeiters motivated by long-term 
profit (e.g., disruptive innovators) and not-for-profit 
counterfeiters (NFPC, e.g., politically or ideologically dri-
ven) may have different objectives, use different tactics, 
and pose different risks.
The assumptions apparent in the responses to this 
survey suggest a rather one-dimensional, or at least 
firm by firm, approach to deceptive counterfeiting 
than, say, that of a joined-up, knowledge-sharing net-
work. Of particular interest here is how counterfeits 
could be used to destabilise a company/brand/mar-
ket/segment or even nation is an important unan-
swered question; for example, by creating so much 
confusion and doubt (the ‘fake news effect) that buyers 
lose trust in accepted sources and are more willing to 
‘experiment’. Such approaches could easily be 
Table 6. Summary of the findings in terms of research 
objectives.
Research Objective Findings
RO1: Explore the sources and 
impacts of deceptive 
counterfeits
– Low-cost items and spare parts are 
the most frequent counterfeits. 
– Majority of items originate 
from second-tier suppliers based 
in parts of Asia and Africa. 
– Counterfeit impact lead to high 
costs for the OEM in terms of 
delays, lost sales, product recalls, 
and even legal action.
R02: Identify mitigation strategies 
employed to overcome 
deceptive counterfeits
– Network transparency to bring 
visibility beyond second-tier 
suppliers; additional QC/QA 
checks for products sourced from 
Asia and Africa low-cost countries. 
– Developing new cost of quality 
and pre-supply evaluation 
approaches.  
– The three most effective 
countermeasures found within 
the remit of purchasing are as 
follows; i) high-levels of 
specifications, ii) contract 
performance review and 
continuous improvement, and iii) 
supplier relationship and contract 
management/development.
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combined with a much longer-term counterfeiting 
perspective than is currently considered, e.g., counter-
feiters could provide a high-quality product that would 
last beyond short-term expectations (also lulling users 
into a false sense of security).
Limitations of the research
All research has limitations, and some of the key short-
comings of this study are presented here. Being 
a survey-based study limited its generalisability but 
brought out some useful inferences in the global supply 
chain context. The true cost of counterfeits is not cur-
rently taken into account in costs of quality calculations 
regarding low-cost sourcing decisions. One of the lim-
itations of survey data is the loss of detail and richness. 
The low response rate on survey is another limitation. 
Future study can explore the grey market, corruption, 
compromised safety/quality standards in the context of 
counterfeit risk. Such analysis could then feed into 
where B2B deceptive counterfeits are most prevalent, 
now, and where they are likely to occur in the future; 
a further critical issue is for research to assess the extent 
to which the counterfeit industry is a response to cycli-
cal economic conditions or a more permanent threat.
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